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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that an account of the effect that the use of adverbials such as
‘actually, in fact, clearly, obviously, perhaps, probably’ has, when qualifying an utterance that is
reconstructed as a standpoint, contributes to a context-sensitive evaluation of argumentative discourse.
The account provided draws from the concept of strategic manoeuvring developed within Pragmadialectics. The effect of qualified standpoints on argumentative discussions is specified in terms of the
protagonist’s management of the burden of proof.
KEYWORDS: epistemic adverbials, management of the burden of proof, obligation to defend,
pragmatic status quo, presumptive status, qualification of standpoints, stance adverbials, starting points,
strategic manoeuvring

INTRODUCTION
In pragmatics and linguistics literature the use of such words as “certainly, clearly,
obviously, perhaps, probably, technically, theoretically, frankly, honestly, actually,
fortunately, surprisingly” to qualify an utterance is accounted for in terms of lowering
the speaker’s commitments, expressing an attitude towards the proposition, or
modifying the illocutionary force of the speech act performed (Lakoff 1980; Holmes
1984; Hoye 1997; Conrad and Biber 2000). Qualifying an utterance is perceived in
communicative, Gricean terms, as being more informative, thus violating the maxim
of manner, something which invites the addressee to infer that the speaker may not
have as much epistemic warrant for what he asserts as he would be taken to have if he
had not qualified his statement (Lyons 1977). Consider the following qualified
utterances collected from the British National Corpus 1 with the adverbial in the
parenthesis and without:
(1) (Clearly) a great variety of difficulty could be introduced into the tests.
[A75 708]
(2) (Evidently), there are many aspects to the question of integration. [EES
2119]
(3) (Fortunately), these sorts of incidents are not common. [CBW 1838]
(4) It was bloody exhausting, (frankly). [A8F 127]
(5) You ought to read about him, (honestly). [HRA 1926]
(6) (Obviously) some situations are much more serious and therefore more
difficult to resolve than a dispute over an untidy room. [B10 1943]
1

A sample of the British National Corpus can be publicly accessed at http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/.
For more search options of the BNC corpus see the interface that Prof. Mark Davies offers online at
http://view.byu.edu/.
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(7) (Perhaps) it is not so much that police behaviour has deteriorated as that
public expectations have risen. [AS6 785]
(8) (Surely) tearing up the Pope’s picture was meant as a symbolic gesture,
not a personal affront. [CEK 4822]
(9) (Technically speaking) as long as nobody was hurt, no injuries, no
damage to the other vehicle, this is not an accident. [A5Y]
(10) (Unfortunately), the real world of cable commerce is far from perfect.
[B7M 1093]
The effect of the use of an adverbial to qualify the whole utterance, as in the examples
above, has been explained in terms of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987), of
hedging as a strategy to negotiate the exchange of information between authors and
readers (Hyland 1998) or as an intrinsic property of language that contributes not only
to interpersonal meaning but also to textual meaning (Hunston and Thompson 2000;
Martin and White 2005).
When these words appear qualifying an utterance that functions as the
standpoint in an argumentative discourse, reconstructed along the lines of the pragmadialectical approach to argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), an
account of their effect in terms of lowering the protagonist’s commitments becomes
insufficient.
Suppose that an utterance such as “Amsterdam is the most beautiful city in
Europe” initiates an argumentative discussion between speaker A who uttered it and
speaker B who asks for reasons that support A’s point of view. In the pragmadialectical approach to argumentation, speaker A is obliged to respond to speaker B’s
challenge not because his utterance constitutes an evaluative claim, or because in
uttering it he has offended speaker B who comes from Paris, or because his claim
goes counter to what is established as the list of the top ten cities of Europe in a recent
survey. Speaker A goes on adducing arguments in support of his point of view
because that is what this form of communication, that argumentation is, requires and
because it is to his best interest as a rational human being to engage in such a
discussion with another party in order to test by critical means whether his point of
view is tenable or not. From the moment he responds to the other party’s challenge,
speaker A accepts his engagement in a critical discussion and is committed to
supporting the tenability of the standpoint in the course of that discussion.
Whether the argumentative discussion gets started after speaker A uttered
“Clearly Amsterdam is the most beautiful city in Europe” or “Perhaps Amsterdam is
the most beautiful city in Europe” instead of the unqualified utterance above, does not
alter the fact that he is obliged to answer speaker B’s challenges by adducing
arguments in support of his point of view. 2 His utterance functions as a standpoint not
because of the way it is formulated but because a context of doubt can be established
and because the utterances preceding or following it can be identified as arguments in
support of it. The difference between the utterance qualified by ‘clearly’ and the
utterance qualified by ‘perhaps’ would not be that the speaker is committed more to
the tenability of the standpoint in the first case and less in the second. The difference
2

Whether it would be more likely that an argumentative discussion starts after someone utters “Clearly,
Amsterdam is the most beautiful city in Europe” instead of “Perhaps, Amsterdam is the most beautiful
city in Europe” or the unqualified “Amsterdam is the most beautiful city in Europe” is an empirical
question worth investigating, which falls outside the interests of this paper. For what I am presenting
here I assume that arguments in support of the point of view that is advanced follow irrespective of
what the kind of the qualifier is.
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would be that while he is in both cases committed to the tenability of the standpoint,
in the first case he appears to be sure about the existence of enough common ground
on the basis of which he can provide support for the tenability of the standpoint, while
in the second case he appears as not being sure about this. Nevertheless, and this is the
interesting part, in both cases he undertakes the obligation to defend the standpoint
that he has advanced.
In this paper, I propose a systematic account of the use of stance adverbials
when they appear qualifying the utterance that functions as a standpoint. By
considering qualification by means of stance adverbials as a presentational device for
the formulation of standpoints, and by relating the effect of their use to the concept of
the burden of proof, a better understanding can be reached regarding the question:
when may a qualified standpoint obstruct the progress of the critical discussion?
QUALIFIED STANDPOINTS
A standpoint, according to the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, is defined
as the externalised position that a party in a real or implicit discussion assumes over a
disputed issue, that is the expressed opinion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984,
Houtlosser 2001). It is analysed in illocutionary terms as the speech act of advancing a
standpoint, whereby the protagonist asserts a positive (or negative) position over the
tenability of the speech act performed at the sentence level. A standpoint is
reconstructed from the piece of argumentative discourse under study either directly
pertaining to an utterance or utterances that have been produced in that discourse
(explicit standpoint) or indirectly from what the analyst can plausibly assume to have
been the arguer’s point of view given the discourse at hand (implicit standpoint).
Qualified standpoints are explicit standpoints reconstructed from an utterance that is
qualified.
An utterance can be qualified by means of single word adverbs known as
stance adverbials. In the Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English, Biber et
al. (1999, p. 853) describe stance adverbials as single word adverbs or adverbial
expressions that “have the primary function of commenting on the content or style of
a clause or a particular part of a clause”. While there is no established agreement
about the groups under which stance adverbials fall, let alone about their names, there
exist some consensus in the literature regarding the following large groups: a)
epistemic adverbials (possibly, perhaps, probably, arguably, clearly, certainly,
obviously), b) domain adverbials (technically, theoretically, logically, morally), c)
evaluative adverbials (fortunately, ironically, paradoxically, unfortunately), and d)
illocutionary adverbials (frankly, seriously, honestly). 3
Of these, epistemic and domain adverbials affect the truth conditions of the
utterance in the sense that their presence alters the conditions under which the
proposition expressed in the utterance can be considered to be true. Evaluative and
illocutionary adverbials do not affect the truth conditions of the utterance in which
they occur. Nevertheless, the function of the adverbials from all four groups can be
understood as framing the utterance in which they occur, in the sense that they convey
a comment that is to be added to what the meaning of the rest of the utterance is.
Epistemic adverbials convey a comment about the degree of probability, while
domain adverbials specify the field in which the speaker’s commitment holds.
3

Different names have been given to the groups described here by different authors (Bellert 1977;
Biber et al. 1999; Fraser 1996; Huddleston and Pullum 2001). The labels that I am using occur the most
frequently in the literature.
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Evaluative adverbials add a comment concerning the speaker’s evaluation of the event
that is described in the utterance and illocutionary adverbials convey a comment
concerning the speech act that is performed by means of uttering the sentence in
which they occur.
However, not all qualified utterances that are reconstructed as standpoints
count as qualified standpoints, too. Consider the following two dialogues:
(11) A: Unfortunately, John is not coming tonight.
B: Why do you say that?
A: The trains are not running and he does not have a car.
(12) A: Unfortunately, John is not coming tonight.
B: Why do you say that?
A: He always brings me some small present when we meet.
In both dialogues, A’s utterance is qualified by the adverbial ‘unfortunately’ that
appears at sentence initial position. Nevertheless, while in response to B’s challenge
in the dialogue at (11) speaker A provides support for the proposition “John is not
coming”, in the dialogue at (12) A gives reasons for the choice of the evaluative
adverbial. While the argument that “the trains are not running and he does not have a
car” would still be relevant support for the standpoint had it been qualified by
‘fortunately’, the argument “he always brings me some small present when we meet”
could not count as relevant or acceptable support for a standpoint qualified by
‘fortunately’.
It is only in the first dialogue, where the argument supports the proposition
and not the evaluative adverbial, that the reconstructed standpoint can be considered
as a qualified standpoint. In the second dialogue, the adverbial does not count as
qualifying the standpoint because it is part of what the reconstructed standpoint
actually is. Here are the standpoints that are reconstructed from the two dialogues,
respectively:
My point of view is that John is not coming tonight
My point of view is that it is an unfortunate fact that John is not coming tonight
A qualified utterance counts as a qualified standpoint when the hearer’s challenge and
the speaker’s argumentation concern the proposition that falls under the scope of the
adverbial, and not the choice of the particular adverbial in the given discourse.
WHAT COMMENT DO STANCE ADVERBIALS ADD? ‘CLERLY’ AND
‘PERHAPS’
The comment that the adverbials from the various groups distinguished above add to
the act of advancing a standpoint is a result of the interpretation of their semantic
content against the background of the context of doubt and of the critical discussion in
which a standpoint is advanced and tested. Consider the epistemic adverbials such as
‘clearly’ and ‘perhaps’. It is not enough to know that epistemic adverbials convey a
degree of commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed in order to interpret
the comment that they add to the act of advancing a standpoint that is reconstructed
from the utterance in which they appear.
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In the pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse, the truth
conditions of an utterance do not play the primary role. As van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1984) stress, utterances which express an evaluation or judgement can
also be reconstructed as a standpoint even though the truth conditions of an assertion
such as “Carmiggelt is Holland’s most entertaining writer” or “You had no right to
put me on that list” cannot be verified. Testing the tenability of a standpoint in a
critical discussion does not amount to establishing the truth conditions of the
proposition that is asserted in it. The tenability of a standpoint is considered tested
when the two parties agree at the end of the discussion that the doubt or the standpoint
should be retracted. The standpoint advanced is not rendered ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’
because a ‘strong’ or a ‘weak’ adverbial qualify the utterance from where it is
reconstructed. 4 A standpoint can be considered strong or weak only after
argumentation in support of it has been advanced and after it is agreed whether the
arguments adduced constitute conclusive defence or not. The presence of a strong or a
weak adverbial in the formulation of a standpoint is a presentational device that the
protagonist may choose in anticipation of a conclusive defence of the standpoint but
not a guarantee of the final outcome.
The comment that epistemic adverbials add to the act of advancing a
standpoint concerns not the committedness of the protagonist, because this is a
prerequisite for the utterance to count as a standpoint in the first place, but the
acknowledgement that there is common ground established already or not. If the use
of weak epistemic adverbials were to be interpreted as indicating weak commitment
to the standpoint, it could not be explained why the speaker would still be obliged to
defend it. And if the use of strong epistemic adverbials were to be interpreted as
indicating strong commitment to the standpoint, it could not be explained why the
speaker would find it necessary to go on defending it.
By using strong epistemic adverbials such as “clearly, obviously, certainly,
surely”, the protagonist indicates to the antagonist that there is common ground,
which is already established, on the basis of which the content and justificatory
potential of the arguments adduced can be accepted. By using weak epistemic
adverbials such as “probably, perhaps, possibly, presumably, arguably”, the
protagonist indicates to the antagonist that there may be no common ground that is
already agreed upon between the two of them, on the basis of which the content and
the potential of the arguments adduced could be accepted. In both cases, the
protagonist goes on adducing arguments, with the only difference that in the first case
he presents his argumentation as more conclusive than in the second case.
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
In order to be in a position to assess whether the choice of a particular adverbial in a
given discourse has obstructed the dispute resolution process, we need to postulate
what the intended effect of their use in an argumentative discussion is. The strategic
manoeuvring approach that is being developed within Pragma-dialectics (van
Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b) opens some space for accounting
for the way discourse is shaped, by interpreting it not only as a result of observing
dialectical rules but also as a result of the arguers’ attempt to have the dispute
resolved in their favour; namely the protagonist to have the standpoint accepted, while
4

In pragma-linguistic literature on such epistemic adverbials as ‘clearly’ and ‘perhaps’ it is also
observed that they do not always and in all contexts convey strong and weak degrees respectively
(Stubbs 1986; Nuyts 1993; Palmer 2001).
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the antagonist to have the doubt accepted. In this view, the qualification of standpoints
can be interpreted as a strategic choice from the presentational devices at the
protagonist’s disposal when advancing it. The effect that qualification has should then
be understood in terms of the burden of proof that is incurred by advancing a
standpoint.
Advancing a standpoint incurs an obligation to defend it, in the sense that the
one who advances it should be ready to adduce arguments in response to the other
party’s challenges. The other party is entitled to ask for arguments in support of the
standpoint because it is assumed that the pragmatic status quo is challenged.
According to van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003, p. 128), the pragmatic status quo is
defined as: “The list of premises that the particular parties involved in the dispute
explicitly or implicitly accept and that define their interactional relationship in the
interactional situation at hand”. It is to the protagonist’s interest to assume the
obligation because it is only by adducing argumentation that he has chances of
removing the antagonist’s doubt for the standpoint and thereby having it accepted at
the end of the discussion. Necessary condition for a successful discharge of the
burden of proof is that the arguments adduced in support of the standpoint are
accepted by the antagonist both in terms of their propositional content and in terms of
their potential in justifying (or refuting) the particular standpoint.
The management of the burden of proof is a normative assumption regarding
the choices that the protagonist of a standpoint makes in his attempt to strike a
successful discharge of the burden of proof. To that end he seeks to downplay the
challenge to the pragmatic status quo that advancing the standpoint constitutes and to
enhance the presumptive status of the arguments he adduces in support of it. The
presence of a particular adverbial qualifying the utterance that functions as a
standpoint is then to be interpreted as the protagonist’s strategic choice to manage the
burden of proof in the given discourse.
Whether the choice of the particular adverbial in the particular discourse has
contributed to the obstruction of the critical testing procedure is a matter of the
interpretation that the analyst can make in the light of the assumption about the
management of the burden of proof that I have formulated above.
IN SEARCH OF CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF QUALIFIED
STANDPOINTS
So far, I have argued that the use of epistemic adverbials such as ‘clearly’ and
‘perhaps’ does not hedge the commitment that the speaker takes upon himself when
he advances a standpoint. While such adverbials convey a degree of commitment to
the truth of the proposition expressed at the sentence level, their use does not directly
affect the commitment that the arguer assumes at the illocutionary level, where the
utterance is reconstructed as a standpoint at the confrontation stage of a critical
discussion. At this level, the arguer is considered fully committed to the tenability of
the standpoint he has advanced and thereby obliged to advance arguments in support
of it. The use of epistemic adverbials affects the way the procedure of testing the
tenability of a standpoint develops by paving a way for the successful discharge of the
burden of proof. 5 Epistemic adverbials as well as the rest of the adverbials from the
large group of stance adverbials are thus treated as presentational devices for the
5

The use of adverbials from the other groups of stance adverbials has the same effect but the way in
which it is achieved differs given the different semantics of the various groups. For evaluative
adverbials see Tseronis (to appear).
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qualification of standpoints at the protagonist’s attempt to manage the burden of
proof. The question to answer in this last section is: how can managing the burden of
proof by means of qualifying the standpoint (using stance adverbials such as ‘clearly’
and ‘perhaps’) derail?
By qualifying the standpoint using epistemic adverbials, the protagonist seeks
to downplay the challenge to the pragmatic status quo that advancing a standpoint
constitutes. This is achieved by the effect that epistemic adverbials have of creating a
distance between the standpoint and the one advancing it. Strong epistemic adverbials
create such a distance by presenting the standpoint as relying on strong evidence that
is known to the audience already, while weak epistemic adverbials achieve the same
effect by presenting the standpoint as resulting from evidence that is not yet known to
the audience. In both cases, the protagonist appears taking a distance because the
utterance that functions as a standpoint is presented either as a fact or as a mere
conjecture.
The protagonist could abuse the potential of these adverbials in order to evade
assuming his obligation to defend right from the start as the following dialogues
illustrate:
(13) A: Clearly Clark Kent is Superman
B: Why do you think that?
A: Don’t tell me you cannot see that!
(14) A: Perhaps Clark Kent is Superman
B: Why do you think that?
A: It’s just a hunch, that’s all.
Nonetheless, these are not cases that I am interested in, since no argumentation is
provided in support of the standpoint advanced and thereby it cannot be said that the
protagonist has assumed the obligation to defend, let alone that he seeks to manage it.
Consider the following texts instead: 6
(15) The main thing to realise with trailer driving is that it only takes one
mistake to wreck the trailer and a nice glider, as well as possibly writing
off a new car. Clearly, it is important to consider each of the ways in
which you can safeguard your equipment because it is no use avoiding
all the flying hazards if you are going to write off your glider on the
ground. Repairs take time and money to carry out and if they can be
avoided gliding will be less expensive in the future. [A0H]
(16) There is always a problem with education providing for skills in
information technology. It has always been noticed that information
technology skills, of which we shall need more and more in the coming
years, have tended to lag behind the demand for those skills. Perhaps it
is not surprising, because those demands change so much and so often.
[HHX]
Here the use of a strong or a weak adverbial did not absolve the protagonist from the
obligation to defend the standpoint he has advanced.
6

Both texts are taken from the BNC corpus, see note 1 above.
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In the first text, ‘clearly’ appears qualifying the standpoint: “it is important to
consider each of the ways in which you can safeguard your gliding equipment when
you transport it on a trailer”. Three arguments can be reconstructed from the text in
support of this standpoint: “one mistake is enough to wreck the trailer and the glider,
or even the car”, “a glider damaged already on the ground will spoil the fun of flying”
and “repairing a damaged glider will cost time and money”. The choice of ‘clearly’
indicates that the protagonist treats the starting points for this discussion as already
agreed upon between him and the implicit antagonist. Namely that it is easy to make
some mistake when driving with a trailer, that gliders are sensitive equipment, that a
damaged glider cannot fly at all, that it takes long and it is expensive to repair a
damaged glider. Given that the text comes from an information leaflet addressing an
audience of people who practice gliding as a hobby, it is expected that the content of
the above propositions is accepted by all those who know what the sport of gliding
involves. Similarly their potential in supporting the standpoint is also expected to be
accepted even for such arguments as “a glider damaged already on the ground will
spoil the fun of flying”, since the argumentation addresses an implicit antagonist who
shares the same interests in gliding as the protagonist of the standpoint. Had the
standpoint addressed a general audience, the justificatory potential of such an
argument would not have been obvious and thereby not strong. In this latter case, the
use of ‘clearly’ would be considered as the protagonist’s attempt to impose a starting
point in the discussion seeking thus an easy way to have the burden of proof
discharged.
In the second text, ‘perhaps’ appears qualifying the standpoint: “It is not
surprising that the offer of information technology skills lags behind the demand for
those skills”. One argument is adduced in support of it, namely “the demands for
information technology skills change so much and so often”. The choice of ‘perhaps’
indicates that the protagonist signals to the antagonist that the starting points for this
discussion have not yet been established between the two of them and thereby only
tentatively suggests to consider such propositions “the offer follows the demand”,
“the offer satisfies the demand at a slow pace” as part of them. The protagonist leaves
it open whether there can be agreement about the content of the argument
“information technology skills change so much and so often” and the extent to which
it may conclusively justify the particular standpoint. The reason for this may be that
the protagonist does not wish to impose a specific starting point on the antagonist, but
it may also be that the protagonist does not wish to be openly committed to a specific
starting point either, especially to one that could have implications for the way the
protagonist plans to go on defending the standpoint. In this latter case, the choice of a
weak epistemic adverbial would count as obstructing the critical testing of the
standpoint because it would allow the space for the protagonist not to commit himself
to starting points from where the antagonist could draw his attacking moves in the
discussion.
As the discussion of the texts at (15) and (16) shows, the use of an adverbial
such as ‘clearly’ or ‘perhaps’ does not instantly immunize the standpoint. The choice
of the one or the other adverbial cannot guarantee a certain effect and does not
necessarily impose a certain reaction on the antagonist. It is a presentational means at
the protagonist’s disposal to take a distance from the standpoint he is advancing. The
interpretation of the comment that the adverbial adds to the act of advancing a
standpoint in the light of information that the analyst can draw from the particular
context can provide an informed evaluation of the argumentative discussion under
study.
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Using an adverbial that presupposes established agreement about starting
points in a discussion where no clue confirms that this is so would count as an illicit
attempt by the protagonist to impose a starting point in order to have the burden of
proof discharged in his favour and thereby obstructs the testing of the standpoint.
Using an adverbial that acknowledges the lack of established common ground
and being reluctant to commit oneself to some proposition as part of the common
ground of the discussion would count as an illicit attempt by the protagonist to exploit
the vagueness about starting points in order to have the burden of proof discharged in
his favour and thus obstructs the testing of the standpoint.
The result in both cases would be that the standpoint becomes immune to
criticism because the utterance by means of which the act of advancing it is performed
appears as self evident and the propositions following it as providing a mere
explanation but no argumentation in support of it.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that the choice of the language user to qualify the
utterance that counts as advancing a standpoint in an argumentative discourse does
not lead by definition to an obstruction of the procedure for the critical testing of that
standpoint. It is a matter of the interpretation of the choice of a particular way to
qualify the standpoint in a given discourse that can help the analyst reach an informed
evaluation of it. To this direction, I have proposed a theoretical explanation of the use
of stance adverbials to qualify standpoints, namely as presentational devices in the
protagonist’s attempt to manage the burden of proof. In this view, by choosing an
adverbial from a particular group the protagonist ideally seeks to downplay the
challenge to the pragmatic status quo that advancing a standpoint constitutes. The use
of epistemic adverbials helps downplaying the challenge by creating a certain distance
between the speaker and the point of view that he advances. Abusing the semantic
potential that these adverbials have by creating such a distance that the standpoint
appears as self-evident constitutes a derailment of the protagonist’s attempt to manage
the burden of proof by qualifying and only then counts as an obstruction to the critical
testing procedure.
link to commentary
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